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This investigation aimed to reveal a mechanism of how different road projects' settings respond 
to macro-economic crisis. Qualitative and quantitative analyses were performed over a sample of 
31 European road projects, in various funding arrangements and life cycle phases, all extracted 
from the Horizon 2020 BENEFIT project cases database. The project setting is described through a 
specific combination of project features and/or values of developed indicators. The analysis was 
applied to identify factors that contributed to projects’ performance regarding the resilience to 
the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. By doing this, it became possible to determine potential 
liabilities of projects that are already in their implementation or use phases. The analysis showed 
there are equally strong contributors to a project’s success within country-specific, as well as 
project-specific features. In order to boost resilience toward sudden and unpredicted disruptions, 
several factors have emerged, such as long term planning, investing in top priority projects 
(preferably medium size investments), with realistic traffic projections and experienced and 
responsible concessionaires, but also having in place strong regulatory bodies and government 
support.The identified mechanism of enhancing the resilience to crisis caused by a specific 
project setting can be beneficial to multiple stakeholders. 
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1. Introduction 
The delivery of transport infrastructure is characterised by considerable complexity, including 
multiple factors that interrelate positively or negatively, leading to specific evidenced 
performance. These projects usually involve high capital costs followed by many years of 
operational costs and require a stable financial environment and constant revenue streams 
(FIDIC, 2012). In addition, multiple actors make decisions that consequently influence the course 
of project development and later, of its operation. Infrastructure projects are also vulnerable to 
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external micro and macroeconomic influences (FIDIC, 2012; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003), and require 
adequate legislation to be in place (Daito et al., .2013; Ponti et al., 2013). 
However, a great deal of research has been conducted in project pre-construction phases 
regarding the prediction of projects’ outcomes based on a set of assessed influencing drivers 
(Vickerman, 2000; Zhang, 2005). Those drivers include projects’ internal and external 
characteristics, contractual arrangements, projects’ participants, and their interaction (Chua et al, 
1999). Zhang (2005) found that the most influential among these factors are the socio-economic, 
investment and political environment of a project. But, in many cases, a change in these 
parameters may occur during a project’s life cycle, requiring the project to adapt to change and 
develop resilience to sudden and unpredicted disruptions. 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) that occurred in 2007/08 was the latest of the big international 
crises that hit the global economy. The GFC was followed by the European sovereign debt crisis 
that began at the end of 2009 and lasted till 2012, when the peripheral Eurozone member states of 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus were unable to repay or refinance their government 
debt, without the assistance of third-party financial institutions (Mladenovic, 2016). 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) report (Kappeler et al., 2010) showed that the Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) market contracted in most European countries during the financial crisis. 
According to Burger et al., (2009) the IMF (International Monetary Fund) also reported a shift in 
preferences of financial institutions from long term loans to short term loans. A review carried 
out by the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) showed that the financial crisis 
significantly affected the rate of new PPP project closures in the second half of 2008 (Izaguirre, 
2010). The review states that projects reaching financial closure after the crisis are facing lower 
debt-equity ratios, higher fees, shorter debt maturities and embedded mechanisms for 
refinancing. 
The GFC had far-reaching implications on the financing and revenue generation of infrastructure 
projects (FIDIC, 2012). A higher cost of financing was a significant implication as well as 
increasing costs and delays on projects (e.g. in implementation, in reaching financial closure) and 
even project cancellations. The reasons for most of the delays were uncertainty regarding future 
demand, access to financial resources and the cost of financing.  
The influence of the GFC was reported in recent years, as one of the most common drivers of 
project performance, beyond any doubt. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to determine 
what are the consequences of the GFC on road infrastructure projects, or more precisely, what are 
the specific characteristics that contribute to the overall project performance and lead to 
improved resilience in times of sudden and unexpected disruptions (e.g. GFC).  
Resilience as a term does not have a unique meaning in academic literature. Commonly used, 
resilience is “an ability of an entity to bounce back” (Henry and Ramirez-Marquez 2012). 
Bocchini, et al. (2014) explained that resilience of civil infrastructure is usually associated with the 
ability to deliver a certain level of service, even after the occurrence of an extreme event, and to 
recover the desired functionality as fast as possible. However, some definitions of resilience 
overlap significantly with other well known concepts such as robustness, fault-tolerance, 
flexibility, survivability and agility (Henry and Ramirez-Marquez 2012). 
In the context of the BENEFIT (Business Models for Enhancing Funding and Enabling Financing 
for Infrastructure in Transport) project, resilience is defined as “the ability of a transport 
infrastructure project to withstand changes within its structural elements with respect to its 
ability to deliver specific outcomes (such as cost and time to completion, expected traffic and 
expected revenue targets)” (Roumboutsos, 2016). Resilience was also defined as the likelihood of 
achieving pre-specified outcomes and expresses the level of vulnerability of the project to adverse 
external implementation conditions (Mladenovic, 2016). 
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Due to the evident complexity of predicting project performance, the first stage was to establish a 
methodology suitable for assessing a project in all phases of its life cycle (i.e. feasibility study, 
pre-award, award, construction, operation and maintenance, renegotiations and reporting).  
Developed indicators that served the objectives of this research were based on the project-specific 
data that involve the assessment of projects’ governance and institutions, funding, financing and 
applied business model. In this approach, no particular stakeholder view is considered.  
The analysis was conducted in two steps, through a qualitative assessment of road infrastructure 
projects and through a quantitative analysis. The developed methodology was applied on 31 real 
road infrastructure projects in 14 European countries. The impact of the GFC was evaluated on 
project outcomes, in particular on cost and time to completion, and actual vs. expected traffic and 
revenues. 
The quantitative analysis explored how adequately developed indicators tackle the change in 
project characteristics and performance during (or after) the GFC, and if they were able to 
adequately address the crisis’ influence on project outcomes. In the context of this research, the 
influence of the GFC was assessed through evaluating changes in projects’ characteristics and 
performance before the crisis (before 2008), and during and after the crisis (after 2008). The 
duration of GFC was not the same for all countries in the sample, therefore it was not considered 
separately.  
2. Methodology 
This investigation relies on the research conducted within the BENEFIT project. It considers 
transport infrastructure delivery, implementation, operation and maintenance as a system 
(Pantelias et al., 2015) that, based on specific inputs, produces outputs (or outcomes) considered 
as the “performance” of the infrastructure investment. In this sense, the complex project 
mechanism is presented with nine indicators which become elements of the respective system: 
the Matching Framework. This research relied on the methodology presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Methodology scheme (Source: Authors’ own) 
 
Based on a review of the information on 31 road projects through the case narratives included in 
the BENEFIT wiki, 2016 and the BENEFIT Cases Studies in Transport Infrastructure e-book (E-
BOOK, 2016), it was possible to qualitatively determine what was the influence of the GFC. 
Moreover, it was possible to extract influences that lead to a specific outcome, whether it is a 
characteristic of a project or entire setting, i.e. a combination of influences. Case narratives were 
prepared by BENEFIT partners, and included project descriptions and self-assessments of 
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projects’ performance and key success factors. In terms of the BENEFIT project, success is 
perceived as delivering infrastructure compliant with given performance criteria. 
Secondly, the values of the respective indicators for each case before and after the crisis were 
analysed with respect to their outcomes quantitatively, based on their case study information. 
Lastly, obtained findings were systematically compared with those of qualitative analyses 
allowing for an improved understanding and an enriched discussion. 
The BENEFIT case studies (E-BOOK, 2016) were described over time through the values of 
respective indicators (Vanelslander et al., 2015; Mitusch et al, 2015; Voordijk et al., 2015 and 
Pantelias et al., 2015) and outcome variables. As they describe key characteristics of the case at 
specific times in the project life cycle, each set of indicators and outcome values is termed a 
“snapshot”. Every project was assessed in six contexts, each represented with respective 
indicators, namely:  
 Implementation context: 
o Institutional Indicator [InI] takes into account political, regulatory and 
administrative stability of a country through several indexes: Political stability & 
absence of violence index, Control of corruption index, Democracy index, Rule of 
law index, Regulatory quality index, Liberalization of transport markets, 
Government effectiveness index and Government efficiency score. 
o Financial Macroeconomic Indicator [FEI] represents the assessment of 
macroeconomic and financial conditions in a country through a Macroeconomic 
environment score and a Financial market development score (both indices are 
part of Global Competitiveness Index). 
 Transport mode context: 
o Reliability/Availability Indicator [IRA] – self explanatory 
 Business model context: 
o Cost Saving Indicator [CSI] is comprised of the capability to construct/monitor 
through the Level of civil works/technical difficulty, Capability to construct, 
Construction risk allocation, Capability in planning and monitoring, application 
of Innovation (binary), Life cycle planning and Ability to operate. 
o Revenue Support Indicator [RSI] presents the ability of projects to generate 
revenues through business scope, Project exclusivity, Network integration, Share 
of greenfield/brownfield/other transport infrastructure, Demand/revenue risk 
allocation, Capability to operate, Operation risk allocation and Share of non-
transport activities. 
 Governance: 
o Governance Indicator [GI] was calculated from the Number of bidders, Contract 
type, Design/construction/commercial/revenue & financial risk allocation, 
Existence of quality performance payments, Exploitation, Existence of 
renegotiation clauses and Occurrence of early contract termination. 
 Funding scheme:  
o Remuneration Attractiveness Indicator [RMI] represents the ability to pay the 
concessionaire, estimated from the Expected revenues as a percentage of total 
project costs, Share of each income stream on total revenues and Type/risk of 
each income source. 
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o Revenue Robustness Indicator [RVI] consists of the Share of each revenue stream 
on total revenues and the Type/risk of each revenue source. 
 Financing scheme: 
o Financing Indicator [FI] represents the capability of projects to attract private 
financing, calculated from government support in funding through Debt 
capital/loans, Equity capital and Type of financiers. 
All indicator values were defined in the range of [0, 1], with the exception of the Cost Saving 
Indicator, which may take values in the range of [–0.33, 1]. In general, if the value of an indicator 
is closer to “1”, it is considered to be stronger and more favourable in terms of better project 
performance. However, in case of the Financing Scheme indicator, a value closer to “1” means a 
larger proportion of public financing. 
In the context of this research, four outcomes are studied: Actual vs. estimated cost to completion, 
Actual vs. estimated time to completion, Actual vs. forecasted traffic and Actual vs. forecasted 
revenue. The first two outcomes are closely related to the project construction phase, whereas the 
latter two are linked to the operational phase. The outcomes may take values [–2, –1, 0, 1, 2], 
where “0” stands for “in line with expectations”, negative values represent outcomes below 
expectations, and vice versa: 
 
           (1) 
 
Alongside with case narratives and case studies, there was also a set of snapshots available for 
most of the analysed projects. Snapshots were prepared by the BENEFIT consortium partners, 
and represent the calculated values of all indicators in several moments of a project’s life: award, 
construction, inauguration (start of operation), operation, crisis, renegotiations and reporting (in 
most cases 2014 or 2015). Based on the information provided, in many cases it was possible to 
capture changes in projects’ performance before and after the crisis. The projects that had 
commenced during or after the beginning of the GFC were excluded from the analysis (A2 
motorway, Koper – Isola, M25, M80 and three projects in Serbia). Indicators were not available 
for four projects: Istrian Y motorway, Bundesautobahn 20, E8 Grimstad – Kristiansand, and 
Horgos – Pozega. Also, the IRA indicator was not analysed in this paper, since availability and 
reliability of the roads in the majority of cases was not connected to the changes in 
macroeconomic conditions, influenced by the GFC, but rather to maintenance activities on the 
section.  
The BENEFIT dataset of cases includes 31 cases concerning the delivery of road infrastructure. 
Twenty-four cases have been delivered through a PPP arrangement and the rest were delivered 
by the public sector, through traditional procurement. This is a sample of projects located in 14 
European countries, awarded in the period from 1987 to 2012 and collected by the 14 partners of 
the BENEFIT consortium. Snapshots were available for 21 projects. Annex 1 presents the detailed 
list of road projects included in the BENEFIT Case Study database. 
2.1 Clustering of countries in light of their resilience to crisis: 
There is, in general, substantial difference in performance between projects in North-Western 
European countries, and projects in Southern European countries. For example, projects in 
Belgium, Croatia, Finland, Germany, Norway and Poland are, according to all four outcomes, 
performing in line with expectations or better. Out of four projects in the UK, only one had a 
delay, and only one project has actual traffic below forecast. On the other hand, most projects that 
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experienced cost and time overrun and traffic overestimation are located in Southern European 
countries. 
The change of FEI from the BENEFIT Implementation context was used as an indicator to 
identify the severity of the impact of the GFC in the countries included in the BENEFIT database. 
The use of two derived indicators, namely 
 
               (2) 
 
and  
 
               (3) 
 
resulted in an identical division of clusters, which was applied in further analysis, as presented in 
Figure 2. The maximum FEI value has been defined as the highest FEI value in the period from 
2006 to 2008. The value of the FEI indicator in 2014 was assumed to be significant, as it was the 
year of reporting for the majority of the projects. 
Table 1. Clustering of countries according to impact of crisis  
Cluster Country Min FEI/ 
Max FEI 
Country 2014 FEI/ 
Max FEI 
High 
impact of 
crisis 
Greece 0.522 Slovenia 0.634 
Slovenia 0.634 Greece 0.642 
Portugal 0.662 Portugal 0.662 
Spain 0.667 Spain 0.667 
United Kingdom 0.722 United Kingdom 0.742 
Serbia 0.742 Serbia 0.758 
Medium 
impact of 
crisis 
Italy 0.806 Italy 0.806 
Denmark 0.806 Croatia  0.840 
Croatia 0.840 Netherlands 0.849 
Netherlands 0.849 Belgium 0.867 
Belgium 0.867 Denmark 0.898 
France 0.878 France 0.902 
Low 
impact of 
crisis 
Czech Republic 0.900 Finland 0.926 
Norway 0.907 Poland 0.974 
Germany 0.908 Sweden 0.979 
Sweden 0.916 Czech Republic 0.988 
Finland 0.926 Germany 0.989 
Poland 0.947 Norway 1.041 
source: Mladenovic et al, 2016 
 
Six projects are located in countries with a low impact of the GFC (Norway, Finland, Germany 
and Poland), four more in countries with a moderate impact of the GFC (Croatia, Belgium, Italy 
and the Netherlands), and the remaining 20 projects in countries that were severely hit by the 
GFC (Greece, Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain and the UK). 
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Figure 2. The clusters of countries represented in BENEFIT cases (source: Mladenovic et al, 2016) 
 
One project (Horgos– Pozega) is excluded from the analysis, since the project never reached 
financial closure, and part of it was later realized as a public project (Horgos – Novi Sad) that is 
included in the database. 
3. Qualitative assessment of road cases  
The main reasons for cost overrun in analysed cases are typically related to scope changes, 
expropriation and archaeology problems and sometimes to other technical issues. The most 
typical reasons for delays in the projects are economic crisis, expropriation problems, design 
changes, technical and archaeology issues, but also bankruptcy of the contractor (Koper – Izola 
Motorway). However, reasons for underestimated traffic levels, and consequential drops in 
project revenues are more than once directly linked to the influence of the GFC.  
3.1 Projects in countries with a low impact of the GFC 
The cluster is represented by projects with medium to high investment sizes, that are either 
greenfield, or both greenfield and brownfield. Five of these projects are delivered as PPPs, while 
only Bundesautobahn 20 in Germany was delivered as a public project. Three of these projects 
were in the operation phase, and two were in the construction phase during the crisis (Figure 3). 
The construction of the A2 motorway in Poland commenced after the crisis. 
The impact of the GFC in these countries was minimal, and all projects that were analysed 
showed a very strong resilience to the crisis.  
The common factor that was underlined throughout the cases was the capability of legal bodies 
for introducing and regulating PPP contracts, through laws and legislation and stable 
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macroeconomic surroundings. In all cases, it was clearly stated that projects involved the 
construction of very important and long-needed infrastructure that serves many users, both local 
and regional. Most of the projects had been planned for a long period of time, since they 
represent important national and regional connections. For example, the E4 motorway project in 
Finland, 70 km-long, that included the construction of 88 bridges, had been planned since 1996. 
 
 
Figure 3. The timeline of road projects in countries with low impact of crisis (source: Mladenovic et 
al, 2016)  
 
The projects were rather exclusive, allowing for physical network integration and represent an 
important link between major conglomerations, which also gave them additional resistance to 
any changes in the economic environment.  
3.2 Projects in countries with a moderate impact of the GFC 
Four road projects in countries that were moderately hit by the GFC include medium to high 
investment size projects in four different countries that are both greenfield and brownfield 
projects, as well as a mix of these two. Three of these projects are PPPs with contract duration 
between 20 and 30 years. Two projects were integrated with railway projects (Via Zeventem and 
Combiplan Nijverdal). 
The first phase of only one of these projects was in operation (Istrian Y motorway in Croatia) 
before the crisis; Via Zeventem in Belgium was under construction, while projects in Italy and the 
Netherlands started with construction after the crisis (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. The timeline of road projects in the countries with moderate impact of crisis (source: 
Mladenovic et al, 2016)  
 
The main purpose of the Via Zeventem project was to improve access and reduce congestion 
north of Brussels’ Zeventem airport. The project was delivered on time and almost to budget. 
However, traffic declined, since both passenger and cargo traffic at the Zeventem airport 
dropped as a result of crisis; nonetheless, the project managed to recover in the meantime. 
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The Istrian Y motorway connects the Istrian Peninsula, one of main tourist regions in Croatia, to 
the A8 and A9 international motorways. The actual traffic growth was higher than anticipated, 
especially for passenger cars, indicating that the impact of the crisis on this project was very 
limited. 
In case of the BreBeMi motorway, the financial crisis came immediately after the commitment 
was signed with the lenders. Despite the crisis, the Italian Government decided to continue with 
all the priority projects included in the three-year General Transport Plan, considering these 
projects, and especially those developed under a PPP model, as drivers for economic growth. 
The Combiplan Nijverdal included both motorway and railway lines across the city of Nijverdal, 
including the tunnel, with the main objective to remove congestion. The project experienced cost 
overrun and delay, primarily due to scope change and introduction of new regulations for 
tunnels. However, there is no reference to the crisis; the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth 
rate increased and the unemployment rate dropped in the region after the contract was signed. 
In case of the cluster of countries with a moderate impact of the crisis, the outcomes of the 
projects were generally not associated with the financial crisis. One of the reasons for this 
resilience was that these projects were highly supported by the Government, and considered as 
top-priority projects. In only one project the crisis caused a drop in the actual traffic level due to 
dependence on the usage of the road to the number of passengers and transportation of goods on 
the connecting airport. However, exclusivity of this link enabled the fast recovery of projected 
revenues.  
3.3 Projects in countries with a high impact of the GFC 
The time frame for project implementation in countries with a high impact of the GFC is 
presented in Figure 5.  
All projects in Portugal and Spain, two out of four UK projects and Attiki Odos in Greece were in 
the operation phase before the crisis. All remaining Greek projects were under construction, as 
well as two projects in Slovenia. The two remaining UK projects and all projects in Serbia 
commenced just after the crisis. 
The impact of the GFC was particularly significant in Greece. The construction of three Greek 
projects was interrupted from 2010 to 2013 and they were subjected to lengthy renegotiations, 
caused mainly by the steep decrease in actual traffic due to the GFC. Renegotiated terms, for all 
three projects, included an increased government participation in the project’s funding, a 
significant reduction of the project size and the payment of claims to the Construction Joint 
Venture. The Moreas Motorway project had a cost overrun of 10% and was delayed for 2.5 years 
due to slow payments on behalf of the state (explained by the GFC) and archaeological findings. 
It was reported that the economic crisis had a severe impact on traffic levels, which affected the 
primary source of income, i.e. cost recovery through tolls. Consequently, the project went 
through several renegotiations, requesting additional capital support from the Greek state and 
payment of claims to the concessionaire. However, unlike three other projects, there was no 
pause in construction. Only the Attiki Odos project (Athens ring road) was in its operation phase 
when the crisis occurred, and has experienced for the first time in 2012 that the actual traffic was 
lower than the predicted one, but has managed to sustain itself despite the crisis.  
The revenue scheme for both projects in Portugal was initially based on shadow tolls. The traffic 
on the A22 motorway dropped in 2008, but was still above expectations, which was explained by 
the touristic nature of the region. Contrary to A22, on A23, the actual traffic and revenues were 
50% below forecast. It was stated that the funding scheme failed during the economic crisis due 
to the non-availability of state subsidies, leading to the need for introducing tolls in previously 
non-tolled infrastructure, which caused major traffic reductions and inefficiencies.  
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Cases for projects in Spain also had significant drops in traffic levels. In other countries from this 
cluster, the crisis has reportedly influenced the macroeconomic environment, causing a rise in 
unemployment, a drop in GDP, etc., which all may have caused drops in mobility and influenced 
traffic levels. However, the projects did not go through renegotiations or cancelations. 
The consequences of the GFC on the poorly performing projects are reflected through the fact 
that many projects have entered renegotiations, which in most cases involved reducing the scope 
of projects and significant reduction of the project size in terms of investment as well as an 
increase in government participation in the funding scheme (e.g. projects in Greece) and 
introduction of user paid tolls or increase in toll prices (e.g. in Portugal). Consequently, the 
distribution of risks shared between the public and private partner has changed substantially 
(e.g. in Greece). 
 
Figure 5. Projects’ timeline for the cluster of countries with high impact of crisis (source: 
Mladenovic et al, 2016)  
 
A common trait of the projects in Greece was their size: they were very large projects (all five 
projects required budgets close to or above one billion euro). This was an unfavourable factor 
since the funding was structured so that part of it had to be covered from user paid tolls on 
already constructed sections. In other words, risk was doubled since revenue risk heavily 
impacted construction risk. Also, in almost all mentioned cases the traffic projections were overly 
optimistic (optimism bias in demand forecasts). One of the additional reasons behind “low 
success” was reportedly related to the political environment (political cycles and budgetary 
purposes).  
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4. Quantitative analysis of road projects before and after the crisis 
Both Implementation context indicators, Institutional indicator (InI) and Financial 
Macroeconomic indicator (FEI) are much lower for Southern European countries. The lower 
values of InI show weaknesses in the political, regulatory and administrative stability of these 
countries compared with North-Western European countries, while generally lower values of FEI 
may suggest greater impacts of the GFC in these countries.  
GI also seems to be influenced by the country context, and is typically constant or varies within 
relatively narrow ranges across all road cases in one country, e.g. all projects in North-Western 
European countries have high values of GI. This indicator was formulated to represent the 
features of the contract (for the construction or operation phase) in terms of type, allocation of 
risks, existence of competition, and features related to revenues and costs. Therefore, GI may be 
influenced by the country context, but not necessarily by country economy, meaning that GI may 
have high values in countries that are experiencing unfavourable macroeconomic conditions in 
case the contract is adequately formulated. For instance, GI in Southern European countries 
ranges from low values in Serbia, to high value for the Attiki Odos case, which is considered a 
successful project in Greece, meaning that GI was able to show the difference between well-
performing and poorly performing projects. 
The average value of CSI is significantly higher for projects in North-Western European countries 
compared with Southern European countries, which reflects the maturity of the construction 
industry. CSI shows capabilities of the contractor to construct or to deal with a technically 
difficult project, but also the capability of the investor to monitor and adequately plan the 
investment project.  
RSI has a wider range (lower minimum and higher maximum values) in Southern European 
countries, compared with North-Western European countries. RSI is generally very low (0.05), 
almost identical and fairly constant in all cases, which shows a general inability of road projects 
to generate other revenues. However, this indicator also includes project exclusivity, capability to 
operate, share of greenfield/brownfield infrastructure and operation risk allocation, meaning 
that generating revenues is a complex mechanism. Therefore, analysing only the RSI indicator, 
without matching with other indicators, may be misleading. The values of RMI for well-
performing PPP projects were higher than for poorly performing ones, indicating a higher ability 
of a project to pay the concessionaire. That shows that the three chosen variables: Expected 
revenues as a percentage of total project costs, Share of each income stream in total revenues and 
Type/risk of each income source were able to capture projects’ remuneration attractiveness, i.e. 
ability to pay the concessionaire. On the other side, RVI that describes a project’s ability to 
generate revenues is a project-specific variable that depends on the Share of each revenue stream 
in total revenues and the Type and risk of each revenue source. 
4.1 Projects in countries with a low impact of the GFC 
It can be argued that all projects in this cluster were highly successful since they have a 100% 
return on investment, traffic in line or above expected, with no cost or time overruns, and do not 
show any influence of the GFC on their overall performance, as shown in Table 2.  
The only project where some impact of the crisis on project outcomes was seen (although all the 
outcomes were still in line with expectations), was the E18 project which had lower traffic and 
revenue outcomes in 2009 compared with 2008 (Table 2). The reason behind this was mainly seen 
in a moderate change in the overall macroeconomic environment (a drop in FEI) and project’s 
ability to generate various sources of revenues (drop in RVI). For E18 there was also a drop in CSI 
during the operation phase, which was explained by a change in the ownership structure, which 
did not influence outcomes. 
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Table 2. Snapshots for road projects in countries with a low impact of the GFC 
Case 
Study 
Snapshot Indicators Outcomes 
InI FEI GI CSI RSI RMI RVI FI 
C
o
st
 
T
im
e 
T
ra
ff
ic
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
E4 
Helsinki-
Lahti 
1997, award 
1998, inn. 
1999 
2001 
2008, GFC 
2012 
0.81 
0.83 
0.83 
0.86 
0.84 
0.86 
0.627 
0.627 
0.637 
0.637 
0.792 
0.766 
0.688 
0.875 
0.750 
0.750 
0.750 
0.750 
0.489 
0.489 
0.489 
0.467 
0.467 
0.467 
0.145 
0.145 
0.145 
0.097 
0.097 
0.097 
1.0 
1.0 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
1.0 
1.0 
1.0 
0.947 
1.0 
1.0 
0.679 - 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
-
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
- 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
E18 
Muurla-
Lohja 
2005, award 
2008, inn. 
2008, GFC 
2009 
0.86 
0.84 
0.84 
0.86 
0.753 
0.792 
0.792 
0.758 
0.688 
0.750 
0.750 
0.750 
0.467 
0.467 
0.133 
0.133 
0.121 0.667 1.0 
1.0 
0.967 
0.824 
0.773 - 
0 
0 
0 
- 
1 
0 
0 
- 
0 
1 
0 
- 
0 
1 
0 
E39 Orkda-
lsvegen 
Public Road 
2003, award 
2005, inn. 
2014 
0.81 
0.82 
0.84 
0.738 
0.808 
0.842 
0.563 0.722 
0.556 
0.667 
0.200 0.333 0.667 0.719 - 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
- 
0 
1 
- 
0 
1 
A2 
Motorway 
2008, award 
2009 
2011, inn. 
 0.630 
0.600 
0.608 
0.688 0.510 
0.719 
0.719 
0.222 
0.216 
0.216 
1.0 0.444 0.752 0 
- 
0 
0 
- 
1 
0 
- 
1 
0 
- 
1 
(Source: Authors’ own) 
 
The common trait of these projects was that InI took very high values ranging between 0.81 and 
0.86. Also, FEI was always above 0.63 as well as GI, indicating strong institutional and financial-
economic projects’ surroundings coupled with projects’ adequate governance in terms of high 
capability for planning and monitoring the investment. Values of other indicators, as seen in the 
Table 2, did not change due to the crisis. 
4.2 Projects in countries with a moderate impact of the GFC 
Table 3 provides snapshots available for three road project in the moderately impacted cluster of 
countries. The only indicator that changed during the GFC was the Financial-Macroeconomic 
indicator (which decreased in all three cases during the crisis), cost-savings and revenue support 
indicators.  
The change in CSI for the Via Zeventem project was a result of different formulation of the 
indicator for construction and operation phases (Table 3), while the increase in the RSI was a 
result of increased capability to manage traffic demand. This project is considered to perform in 
line with expectation, according to the outcomes. 
Table 3. Snapshots for road projects in countries with a moderate impact of the GFC 
Case 
Study 
Snapshot Indicators Outcomes 
InI FEI GI CSI RSI RMI RVI FI 
C
o
st
 
T
im
e 
T
ra
ff
ic
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
Via 
Zeventem 
2006, award 
2014 
 0.690 
0.600 
0.688 0.515 
0.449 
0.206 
0.216 
0.667 0.000 0.740 - 
1 
- 
1 
- 
0 
- 
0 
BreBeMI 2009, 
beg.works 
2014 
0.492 
 
0.450 
0.492 
 
0.450 
NA NA 0.142 0.333 0.667 0.735 - 
 
1 
- 
 
1 
- 
 
1 
- 
 
0 
Combiplan 
Nijverdal 
2006, award  
2007 
2013, inn. 
2014 
0.760 
0.775 
0.660 
0.650 
0.760 
0.775 
0.660 
0.650 
 
0.479 
 
0.375 
0.148 
0.137 
0.245 
0.313 
0.202  
1.000 
 
0.833 
0.000 1.000 - 
0 
-1 
- 
- 
0 
-1 
- 
- 
0 
-1 
- 
- 
0 
0 
- 
(Source: Authors’ own) 
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For the BreBeMI project the only indicator that changed between snapshots is the FEI. However, 
there was only one available snapshot, from 2014, showing that the project performed in line or 
above expectations. 
Only the Combiplan Nijverdal project had available snapshots for “before” and “after” the crisis 
and had experienced a decrease in performance, regarding cost, time and traffic project 
outcomes. However, the initial decrease in CSI for Combiplan Nijverdal project was a result of 
decreased capability to monitor construction, resulting from technical difficulties in the project. 
CSI at the end of the construction phase indicates improved capability to monitor construction. 
However, the general negative outcome of the project at the end of the construction phase was 
not related to the impact of the crisis. 
4.3 Projects in countries with a high impact of the GFC 
Table 4 gives an overview of respective indicators for projects in the cluster of countries with a 
high impact of the crisis. There is a clear drop in CSI and FEI “before” and “after” the GFC, based 
on available snapshots for Greek projects. The sharp decrease in CSI after the GFC reflects the 
pause in construction of three projects. The CSI has increased during operation only for the well 
performing project in Greece, i.e. Attiki Odos. 
In addition, a distinctive decrease of FEI implied changes in macroeconomic project 
surroundings. Although all the countries from this group experienced a significant drop in FEI, 
for the success of the project, its initial value was also relevant. For example, in Spain and UK InI 
was above 0.6 and FEI above 0.5 (before and after the crisis); in Portugal and Slovenia InI was 
above 0.6, however FEI had lower values after the crisis, and finally in Greece InI was close to 0.6 
and FEI was as low as 0.3.  
The indicators in available snapshots for Portuguese road projects show a sharp drop in CSI as a 
result of a reduced capability to operate the projects, as well as drop in FEI. Both indicators may 
explain the drop in traffic outcome (traffic below forecast). This was influenced by renegotiations 
and introduction of tolls. The changes in RMI (increase in value) were a consequence of different 
risk allocation and introduction of tolls, as a result of renegotiation processes.  
In Spain, the same pattern was present, i.e. a drop in both CSI and FEI after the occurrence of the 
GFC. These projects are particularly interesting from the aspect of the influence of the crisis, since 
they experienced a drop in traffic and in revenues, as a direct consequence of the crisis, and had 
managed to recuperate from in the following few years. For example, for both M45 and Radial 2 
Motorway, revenues were below the expectation in 2012, and in line with the expectations in 
2014. The change in FEI shows a general drop in countries’ economic power, which influenced a 
drop in traffic. However, after increased participation of the government, seen in the increase of 
FI, projects managed to sustain and to generate the expected profit. 
Finally, in the UK set of projects, a distinct drop in FEI was detected, since the UK is also a 
country severely hit by the crisis. However, the values of other indicators did not change 
drastically, and revenues, time and cost outcomes were all in line with projections. Unlike other 
projects from this cluster, these projects had very high values of GI and InI (ca. 0.8), meaning that 
institutional frameworks and adequate governance played a major role in fulfilling the projects’ 
expected outcomes. 
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Table 4. Snapshots for projects in high impact cluster of countries 
Case 
Study 
Snapshot Indicators Outcomes 
InI FEI GI CSI RSI RMI RVI FI 
C
o
st
 
T
im
e 
T
ra
ff
ic
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
C-16 Terr-
asa Manre-
sa toll mot.y 
1987, award 
1990, inn. 
2015 
0.7 
0.70 
0.69 
0.637 
0.637 
0.467 
0.563 0.511 
0.133 
0.200 
0.201 0.333 0.667 0.406 
0.300 
0.300 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
0 
0 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
0 
0 
Eje  Aero 
puerto             
(M-12) 
Motorway 
2002, award 
2005, inn. 
2008 GFC 
2012 
2014 
0.76 
0.73 
0.68 
0.69 
0.69 
0.617 
0.678 
0.700 
0.508 
0.467 
0.500 0.541 
0.541 
0.311 
0.311 
0.311 
0.040 0.333 0.667 0.640 
0.640 
0.640 
0.670 
0.698 
- 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-2 
- 
0 
-1 
-1 
0 
M-45 1998, award 
2000, inn. 
2008 GFC 
2012 
2014 
0.72 
0.74 
0.68 
0.69 
0.69 
0.637 
0.637 
0.700 
0.508 
0.467 
0.563 0.533 
0.583 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
0.089 0.667 0.063 0.703 - - - - 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
Radial 2 
Toll 
Motorway 
2000, award 
2003, inn. 
2008 GFC 
2012 
2014 
0.74 
0.69 
0.68 
0.69 
0.69 
0.637 
0.638 
0.700 
0.508 
0.467 
0.500 0.244 
0.244 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
0.089 0.333 0.667 0.640 
0.640 
0.640 
0.669 
0.698 
- 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-2 
- 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-2 
- 
0 
-1 
-1 
0 
Moreas 
Motorway 
2007, award 
2013,fin.pause 
0.61 
0.57 
0.558 
0.308 
0.750 0.561 
0.750 
0.301 0.400 0.679 0.765 
0.816 
- 
-1 
- 
-1 
- 
-1 
- 
-1 
Ionia 
Odos 
Motorway 
2007, award 
2010, pause 
2013, restart 
0.61 
0.58 
0.57 
0.558 
0.458 
0.308 
0.750 0.506 
-.011 
0.226 
0.269 
0.255 
0.247 
0.433 0.667 0.554 
0.554 
0.622 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
-2 
-2 
- 
-1 
0 
Elefsina 
Kor. Patra 
Pyrgos 
Tsakona 
2007, award 
2010, pause 
2013, restart 
0.61 
0.58 
0.57 
0.558 
0.458 
0.308 
0.625 0.514 
-.021 
-.021 
0.255 
0.244 
0.222 
0.400 0.667 0.796 
0.796 
0.644 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
-2 
-2 
- 
-1 
0 
Central 
Greece 
(E65) Mot. 
2007, award 
2010, pause 
2013, restart 
0.61 
0.58 
0.57 
0.558 
0.458 
0.308 
0.625 
0.625 
0.750 
0.510 
0.314 
0.237 
0.173 
0.173 
0.186 
0.333 0.667 0.913 
0.913 
0.938 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
-1 
-1 
- 
-2 
-2 
- 
-1 
0 
Attiki 
Odos 
(Athens 
Ring 
Road) 
1999, award 
2001,inn.1sec. 
2004, compl. 
2009 
2014 
0.59 
0.60 
0.62 
0.59 
0.57 
0.543 
0.543 
0.587 
0.500 
0.358 
0.688 0.230 
0.313 
0.313 
0.427 
0.427 
0.224 
0.224 
0.229 
0.229 
0.224 
0.333 0.667 0.561 - 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
1 
1 
1 
-1 
- 
1 
1 
1 
0 
A22 
motorway 
2000, award 
2011,bef.ren. 
2013 
0.69 
0.68 
0.70 
0.540 
0.517 
0.442 
0.625 
0.625 
0.813 
0.464 
0.598 
0 
0.188 
0.188 
0.267 
0.383 
0.383 
0.667 
0.095 
0.095 
0.283 
0.779 - 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
- 
1 
-2 
- 
1 
-1 
A23 
motorway 
1999, award 
2011,bef.ren. 
2013 
0.69 
0.68 
0.70 
0.540 
0.517 
0.442 
0.625 
0.625 
0.813 
0.318 
0.489 
0 
0.200 
0.200 
0.222 
0.383 
0.383 
0.667 
0.095 
0.095 
0.283 
0.779 - 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
- 
-1 
-2 
- 
-1 
-1 
A5 Mari-
bor Pince 
motorway  
2005, award 
2008,inn. 
2014 
0.64 
0.68 
0.66 
0.595 
0.683 
0.433 
0.563 0.097 
-0.007 
0 
0.151 1.0 1.0 1.0 - 
1 
1 
- 
-1 
0 
- 
1 
1 
- 
1 
1 
A-19 Dish-
forth to 
Tyne Tunn. 
1996, award 
1998, inn. 
2014 
0.82 
0.83 
0.79 
0.635 
0.635 
0.600 
0.688 0.411 
0.411 
0.667 
0.075 0.667 0.063 0.525 - 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
The BNRR 
(M6 
Tollroad) 
1992, award 
2003, inn. 
2008, GFC 
2012 
2014 
0.82 
0.81 
0.80 
0.79 
0.79 
0.635 
0.665 
0.742 
0.600 
0.600 
0.813 0.522 
0.172 
0.611 
0.611 
0.611 
0.045 0.347 
0.347 
0.333 
0.333 
0.333 
0.673 
0.673 
0.667 
0.667 
0.667 
0.640 
0.640 
0.300 
0.300 
0.300 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(Source: Authors’ own) 
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5. Conclusions 
A strong influence of the GFC was reported in a number of case studies causing significant time 
and cost overruns for projects that were in the construction phase, as well as a drop in traffic for 
projects in the operation phase, particularly for those in Southern European countries.  
The GFC caused a drop in AADT (Average Annual Daily Traffic) which was a direct 
consequence of the drop in economic power and overall activity (Spain, Portugal and Greece). As 
a result of the crisis, GDP was also lower than expected in a number of countries (Slovenia, 
Portugal and Greece), which led to cash flow difficulties as a consequence of public budget 
restrictions (Spain, Greece and Portugal). Finally, as a consequence, a drop in revenues was 
witnessed in projects in Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
The GFC also had an indirect impact on road infrastructure projects by causing renegotiations of 
contracts (examples were found in Portugal, Greece and the UK). New, renegotiated terms of 
contract, included reducing the scope of projects and significant reductions of the project size 
(e.g. in Greece), increased government participation (Greece), payment of claims (Greece), 
introduction of tolls on previously non-tolled sections (Portugal) and rebalance of risks shared 
between public and private partners (Greece).  
With respect to the four basic performance outcomes studied (cost and time to completion, traffic 
and revenue forecasts), no single combination of factors was identified having a positive effect on 
all four targets. However, one factor that was identified to have an impact on all outcomes was 
the implementation context and its indicators InI and FEI. This has been confirmed by analyzing 
the case studies qualitatively, as well as matching the values of respective indicators “before” and 
“after” the crisis. Almost all cases confirmed the importance of a strong regulatory body in the 
country, as well as the importance of government support. 
The critical success factors that led to successful projects, most resilient to sudden and 
unpredictable changes in project surroundings included long term planning regarding project 
funding and choice of top priority projects which are long-needed infrastructures with a high 
level of exclusivity and which allow network integration, i.e. more efficient routes in comparison 
with existing ones. Long-term planning was even more efficient if project design was of good 
quality, and traffic projections were realistic and adequate.  
The capability to construct, i.e. the choice of a responsible and experienced contractor, was also 
pointed out as a very influential characteristic. Although the project success depends on the 
importance of the project to the overall users, this analysis also showed that projects that were 
medium in size (or divided into several stages) outperformed really large project and were less 
sensitive to changes caused by the crisis. In case of PPP projects, one of the essential common 
characteristics for success and resilience of projects was a responsible and well experienced 
concessionaire. 
Finally, both qualitative and quantitative investigations revealed the significance of good 
governance (expressed through GI) which in combination with other indicators substantially 
improves the potential for achieving cost and time projections. This involves effective 
administration, competitive tendering and contracting arrangements, good communication and 
management between project participants, adequate and timely changes in laws and the potential 
for timely reorganizations of public bodies (i.e. ministries). This points out the significance of 
public authority competence and good institutions. The cases showed that good governance, 
strong institutions, and capable participants are the core characteristics that determine a project’s 
resilience and have the potential to overcome changes in a project’s surroundings. 
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Appendix A: List of case studies included in the analysis 
 
Case study Country 
Year of 
award 
PPP/ 
Public 
Duration of 
PPP 
contract 
Project type 
Budget 
size1 
Via Zeventem Belgium 2007 PPP 30 years Brownfield Low 
Istrian Y Motorway Croatia 1997 PPP 28 years Brownfield High 
E4 Helsinki– Lahti Finland 2012 PPP 15 years Both GF&BF Medium 
E18 Muurla– Lohja Finland 2005 PPP 24 years Greenfield Medium 
Bundesautobahn 20 Germany 1992 Public – Greenfield High 
Athens Ring Road   Greece 1996 PPP 25 years Greenfield High 
Central Greece (E65) 
Motorway 
Greece 2007 PPP 30 years Both GF&BF 
High 
Elefsina Korinthos Patra 
Pyrgos Tsakona Motorway 
Greece 2007 PPP 30 years Both GF&BF Medium 
Ionia Odos Motorway Greece 2007 PPP 30 years Brownfield High 
Moreas Motorway Greece 2007 PPP 30 years Both GF&BF Medium 
BreBeMi Italy 2003 PPP 20 years Both GF&BF Medium 
Combiplan Nijverdal The Netherlands 2010 Public – Brownfield Medium 
E18 Grimstad–Kristiansand Norway 2005 PPP 25 years Greenfield Medium 
E39 Orkdalsvegen Public 
Road 
Norway 2003 PPP 25 years Both GF&BF 
Low 
Horgos – Pozega Serbia 2007 PPP ? Both GF&BF High 
Belgrade By-pass Project, 
Section A 
Serbia 2010 Public – Greenfield 
Low 
E-75, Donji Neradovac–
Srpska kuca 
Serbia 2011 Public – Brownfield 
Low 
E-75, Horgos– Novi Sad (2nd 
phase) 
Serbia 2009 Public – Both GF&BF 
Low 
A5 Maribor Pince motorway  Slovenia 2005 Public – Brownfield Medium 
Koper –Izola Expressway Slovenia 2010 Public – Greenfield Low 
C-16 Terrassa– Manresa Toll 
Motorway 
Spain 1987 PPP 50 Greenfield Low 
Eje Aeropuerto (M-12) 
Motorway 
Spain 2002 PPP 25 Greenfield 
Medium 
M-45 Spain 1999 PPP 25+ext. Greenfield Medium 
Radial 2 Toll Motorway Spain 2001 PPP 25+ext. Greenfield Medium 
A2 Motorway Poland 2009 PPP 25 years Greenfield High 
A22 Motorway Portugal 2000 PPP 30 years Both GF&BF Low 
A23 Motorway Portugal 1999 PPP 30 years Greenfield Medium 
A-19 Dishforth UK 1996 PPP 30 years Brownfield Low 
BNRR (M6 Toll) UK 1992 PPP 30 years Greenfield High 
M-25 Orbital  UK 2009 PPP 30 years Brownfield High 
M-80 (Haggs) UK 2008 PPP 30 years Both GF&BF Medium 
Note: 1Low (<400 Million Euros), Medium (400–1000 Million Euros), High (>1000 Million Euros) 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
